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Crowdsourcing is widely proposed as a method to solve a large variety of judgment tasks, such as classifying
website content, peer grading in online courses, or collecting real-world data. As the data reported by workers
cannot be verified, there is a tendency to report random data without actually solving the task. This can
be countered by making the reward for an answer depend on its consistency with answers given by other
workers, an approach called peer consistency. However, it is obvious that the best strategy in such schemes
is for all workers to report the same answer without solving the task.
Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] show that, in some cases, exerting high effort can be encouraged in the
highest-paying equilibrium. In this article, we present a general mechanism that implements this idea and
is applicable to most crowdsourcing settings. Furthermore, we experimentally test the novel mechanism,
and validate its theoretical properties.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is an effective method for eliciting information for a variety of tasks,
such as classifying website content, peer grading in online courses, or gathering data
about the real world. As workers are recruited anonymously through the Internet, a
major issue is how to ensure that their answers are accurate. There are two aspects
to this problem: selecting workers with the best abilities for the task, and getting
them to invest their best effort to obtain the most accurate answers. A large body of
work has been devoted to the issue of how to select workers for tasks, either through
learning their quality and assigning them to the most appropriate tasks, or through
incentive schemes (mechanisms) that encourage self-selection of the most competent
workers [Singla and Krause 2013; Witkowski et al. 2013].
The other issue is to get workers to invest sufficient effort. An obvious strategy that
maximizes workers’ profit is to just provide arbitrary answers without even solving
the tasks. This is clearly observable in practice, in which crowdsourcing tasks attract
a significant portion of workers that provide random answers.
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We propose to overcome this problem by making payments depend on the accuracy
of answers, so that only workers that provide actual work are rewarded. This will
complement existing methods for filtering answers and workers such as gold tasks, but
will also help because workers that do not provide useful answers are discouraged from
participating in the tasks in the first place. At first glance, this appears to be impossible,
as the system itself cannot verify the accuracy of answers given by workers.
Remarkably, this problem can be solved elegantly by setting up a game among work-
ers, called a mechanism in game theory. Instead of paying fixed payments per answer
or hour of time, the rewards are calculated as a function of a worker’s answer and
the answers given by other workers. The game is designed so that the strategies that
carry the highest expected reward require workers to solve the tasks, whereas random
answers will, on average, produce no reward.
This approach has been tried with success on platforms such as Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT). Harris [2011] considered the task of screening re´sume´s for a job descrip-
tion. A scheme in which payments depend on the agreement of answers with those of
a human resources expert provided significant improvements in accuracy. Shaw et al.
[2011] tested a large variety of reward schemes using a task of classifying the type of
content present on a website, and found that schemes based on consistency of answers
had the best performance. Giving rewards for agreeing with another worker has also
been used in the very successful ESP game [Ahn and Dabbish 2004], in which players
are rewarded for assigning the same label as a peer to an image. Kamar and Horvitz
[2012] proposed to reward workers based on comparison of the answers with the aggre-
gate obtained from the crowd. Huang and Fu [2013b] investigated the peer-consistency
incentive scheme using a task of counting nouns in a list of 30 English words. Work-
ers were rewarded with a bonus whenever their answer agreed with that of a single,
randomly chosen peer. They found that this increases accuracy more than comparing
against a gold standard. The same authors also showed that social pressure can further
increase accuracy [Huang and Fu 2013a]. Faltings et al. [2014b] showed a modified ver-
sion of peer consistency, called the peer truth serum, that allows the answer distribution
to be biased, and showed that it can correct anchoring bias in a counting task on AMT.
Mechanisms based on agreement of answers, also known as peer consistency, peer
prediction, or output agreement, have been game-theoretically analyzed for the prob-
lem of incentivizing workers to give truthful information [Miller et al. 2005; Prelec
2004; Prelec and Seung 2006; Witkowski and Parkes 2012a, 2012b; Goel et al. 2009;
Lambert and Shoham 2008; Zhang and Chen 2014; Radanovic and Faltings 2014]. The
main difference is that, in crowdsourcing, obtaining an accurate answer requires costly
effort, so that the difference in rewards between an accurate and inaccurate answer
has to exceed the cost of this effort. With this additional condition, reward schemes
that have been developed to incentivize truthful information reporting can be adapted
for use in crowdsourcing.
However, game theoretic analysis shows that truthful reward schemes based on com-
paring individual answers necessarily require unrealistic assumptions of highly homo-
geneous user populations [Jurca and Faltings 2009; Radanovic and Faltings 2013; Wag-
goner and Chen 2013, 2014]. Even for homogeneous populations, minimal mechanisms
that elicit individual answers cannot be constructed in an arbitrary context [Radanovic
and Faltings 2013, 2015b]. Nonminimal mechanisms, such as the Bayesian truth
serums [Prelec 2004; Witkowski and Parkes 2012b; Radanovic and Faltings 2013,
2014], are applicable in this case, but the burden of eliciting additional information
restrict their practicality. Furthermore, strategies in which all workers report identical
answers are alwaysmore profitable, and such behavior has been observed in user exper-
iments ([Gao et al. 2013]).We do note that some schemes are designed for heterogeneous
populations (e.g., Witkowski and Parkes [2012a]), but they require that the elicitation
process has a clear temporal structure, which is often inconvenient for crowdsourcing.
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These negative results can be overcome by reward schemes that depend on workers
solving many tasks. Recently, Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] have proposed a reward
scheme that uses multiple tasks to achieve incentive compatibility for heterogeneous
populations. The most profitable strategy for workers is to solve the tasks with their
best effort, and random answers carry, on average, no reward. However, their scheme
is only applicable to tasks with two possible answers, so that there cannot be any
correlation between possible answer values.
Contributions
In this article, we present a novel mechanism that extends the mechanism of Dasgupta
and Ghosh [2013] to allow any number of possible answers while also ensuring that a
strategy profile in which all workers exert high effort and report their results truthfully
is the most profitable equilibrium. Just like the mechanism in Dasgupta and Ghosh
[2013], it is easy to understand but can be more broadly applied.
The mechanism combines the ideas from Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] andWitkowski
and Parkes [2013] with the Peer Truth Serum (PTS) introduced in Jurca and Faltings
[2011] and Faltings et al. [2014a, 2014b]; we call it the Peer Truth Serum for Crowd-
sourcing (PTSC). The idea behind the mechanism is to use the distribution of reported
answers from similar tasks as the prior probability of possible answers, and scale the
reward given for agreement between workers with this distribution. This solves the
major issue with the PTS mechanism presented in Faltings et al. [2014b], which is that
the prior distribution had to be known. While a similar approach has been studied in
Witkowski and Parkes [2013], its analysis did not include all of the incentive properties
discussed in Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013].
Unlike the mechanism from Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013], PTSC uses its statistic
(prior obtained from reports) in a nonlinear manner. When the statistic is calculated
from only two a priori similar tasks, PTSC is equivalent to the mechanism from
Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013], which requires possible answer values to be uncorre-
lated. However, when the sample is large, PTSC allows more significant correlations
among different values. We also note that, unlike the mechanism in Dasgupta and
Ghosh [2013], PTSC does not assume that any particular worker solves more than one
task. Moreover, we show how to elicit a value of the mechanism’s scaling parameter
for which high effort and honest reporting is the most profitable equilibrium. Finally,
we apply the PTSC mechanism in community (participatory) sensing and peer grading
settings, and report on empirical results that validate its theoretical properties. The
proofs to our formal claims can be found in the corresponding Online Appendix.
2. THE PEER TRUTH SERUM FOR CROWDSOURCING
In our crowdsourcing model shown in Figure 1, a group of workers w, p, and q solve
their tasks tw, tp and tq, respectively. After worker w evaluates the correct answer to
the task tw, worker w updates belief Pr(xp, xq|xw) regarding the evaluations of other
workers and reports the value that leads to the maximum expected reward according
to belief Pr(xp, xq|xw). In the final step, worker w is rewarded using a peer evaluation
mechanism τ that uses the fact that workers who solve the same tasks have statistically
more correlated answers than those who do not.
This setting depicts a typical crowdsourcing scenario: a group of workers is given
a bundle of a priori similar tasks to solve, and each worker solves only some of the
tasks from the bundle. For example, in text annotation, a requester (mechanism) could
give 1000 sentences to annotate, and a group of, for example, 100 workers would be
assigned to perform the tasks, in which each worker would annotate, for example, 50
sentences. Once the tasks are completed, the mechanism rewards workers for solving
the tasks. To simplify the description of our mechanism, we will suppose that a worker
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Fig. 1. The setting analyzed in this article.
w solves one task: this easily generalizes to cases in which worker w solves more than
one task by applying the mechanism to each task solved by worker w separately.
The basic principle of a proper peer-prediction mechanism is to reward a respondent
based on how surprisingly common that respondent’s report is among the reports of
peers. The PTS mechanism [Jurca and Faltings 2011; Faltings et al. 2014b] rewards
a worker who reports answer x only if a randomly chosen peer who worked on the
same task also gave the same answer. It uses a commonly known prior probability
distribution R(x) over possible answers x, and rewards a matching answer x with 1R(x) .
It thus implements a principle of rewarding answers that are surprisingly common:
common because they match those of a peer, and surprising because less likely answers
carry a higher reward.
PTS has been shown to be useful in applications such as opinion polls [Garcin and
Faltings 2014] and community sensing [Faltings et al. 2014a]. While PTS has been
successfully applied in human computation [Faltings et al. 2014b], it has been limited to
scenarios in which there is a known prior bias. For wider applications in crowdsourcing,
there are two drawbacks:
ALGORITHM 1: The Peer Truth Serum for Crowdsourcing
Reward a worker w for solving task tw as follows:
(1) Calculate the frequency of reported values within all tasks (excluding the report of worker
w). Let us denote this frequency by Rw, which is equal to Rw(x) = num(x)∑
y num(y)
, where num is the
function that counts occurrences of reported values, and the summation in the denominator
goes over all possible answers y.
(2) Select a peer worker p who was given task tw to solve.
(3) Worker w is rewarded for reporting xw with the score:
τ (xw, xp) = α · (τ0(xw, xp) − 1), (1)
where xp is worker p’s report, α is a constant strictly greater than 0, and τ0 is defined as:
τ0(xw, xp) =
{
1
Rw (xw )
if xw = xp
0 if xw = xp , (2)
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—The distribution R needs to be known.
—Consequently, workers can collude and report the least likely value xmin =
argminx R(x) to obtain significantly greater payoff than for honest reporting.
2.1. The Novel Mechanism
In this article, we show how to eliminate these drawbacks by obtaining R from the
answer distribution of the workers themselves. The mechanism, called Peer Truth
Serum for Crowdsourcing (PTSC), is shown in Algorithm 1. The mechanism represents
a game in game theoretic context: the utility of eachworker depends on reports (actions)
of other workers. Therefore, we use an equilibrium analysis to determine the resulting
behavior of workers.
The PTSC score requires only one peer p. If, however, we can assign multiple peers
p to worker w (more than one peer worker p solves task tw), the final score to worker w
can be the average of the PTSC scores over all selected peers:
τ (xw, xp) = α ·
(
1
npeers
∑
p
τ0(xw, xp) − 1
)
(3)
where npeers is the number of peers of worker w and τ0 is defined by Equation (2).
Scores (1) and (3) are equivalent in expectation; thus, the incentive properties of the
mechanism are the same. However, using multiple reports reduces the variance in
payments, which may often be desirable. Notice that the PTSC score (Equation (3))
is proportional to the ratio of the frequency of reports equal to xw within task tw and
the frequency of reports equal to xw within all the tasks (report xw excluded). In other
words, PTSC rewardsworkerw based on how surprisingly commonworkerw’s report is:
reports xw that are more common within task tw than expected by empirical frequency
R receive higher rewards than those reports that are not as common as expected.1
We now give an intuitive understanding of the PTSC mechanism, assuming a sce-
nario in which there are many tasks and the histogram of answers is thus a good
approximation of the answer probability distribution. A more formal analysis, includ-
ing cases with a small number of tasks, is given later in the article.
To decide on the best strategy, a worker w should estimate the reward expected for
reporting answer x. This depends crucially on the worker’s beliefs about the answer
reported by the worker’s peer. Notice that worker w does not need to know R. However,
the worker’s belief about R(x) is equal to that worker’s prior belief Pp(x) about the
evaluations of the other workers, provided that they are honest.
Consider first the case in which the worker does not solve the task at all. In this
case, the worker should believe the peer answer to be distributed according to R used
in Algorithm 1; thus, the expected reward is equal to zero for all possible reports. The
worker thus has no interest in participating in the mechanism, and we can expect that
such workers will not elect to participate.
Otherwise, the worker will have spent some effort to solve the task, and will endorse
an answer x, that is, x is the worker’s evaluation of the correct answer. Finally, the
worker will form a posterior belief Pp|w(x|x) about the answer given by the peer worker.
We now come to a crucial assumption: the worker should believe that the answer of the
peer will be positively correlated with the worker’s answer. More precisely, the worker
should believe that the posterior Pp|w differs from the worker’s prior Pp by giving the
highest increase to the worker’s own answer x:
Pp|w(x|x)
Pp(x)
>
Pp|w(x¯|x)
Pp(x¯)
,∀x¯ = x (4)
1To simplify our notation, we often omit subscript w from Rw .
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To understand this condition, let us apply the Bayes’ rule, which converts it to:
Pw|p(x|x)
Pw(x)
>
Pw|p(x|x¯)
Pw(x)
⇔ Pw|p(x|x) > Pw|p(x|x¯),∀x¯ = x,
or more elegantly x = argmaxx¯ Pw|p(x|x¯). In other words, worker w believes in most
likely endorsing answer x when the peer endorses the same answer x.
We discuss this condition in more detail later on; it is satisfied, for example, in
Dirichlet-categorical models with Bayesian updating, while the simplest example in
which the condition does not hold is when the answers of worker w and p are indepen-
dent, that is, Pw|p(x|x¯) = Pw(x).
To see the importance of this condition, which we call the self-predicting condition,
suppose that workers other than worker w are honest. In that case, the expected score
of worker w for reporting y is α · Pp|w(y|x)R(y) − α, with
Pp|w(y|x)
R(y) being a good approximation
of Pp|w(y|x)Pw(y) . Thus, provided that worker w’s beliefs satisfy the self-predicting condition,
inequality (4) exactly shows that reporting x leads to the highest possible expected
reward. Notice that the self-prediction differs from condition x = argmaxx¯ Pp|w(x¯|x),
which states that worker w believes one’s answer is adopted by the majority, and is
arguably a stronger condition to satisfy. For example, this condition implies the self-
prediction in binary answer spaces for a reasonable updating assumption Pp|w(x|x) >
Pp(x), while the other way around is not true.
Notice that worker w1’s and worker w2’s beliefs about the answers of other workers,
and consequently their beliefs about R, need not be common. More precisely, each
worker can have one’s own private prior belief regarding what others report for a task
that the worker has not solved, and one’s own posterior belief regarding what others
report for a task that the worker has solved. Furthermore, these beliefs incorporate
the fact that workers can obtain their answers differently, for example, a worker
might perceive oneself as more accurate than others. This is contrary to many existing
mechanisms, in which either these beliefs are common among workers (agents) or are
known to the center.
2.2. Example
To demonstrate the principles of the PTSC mechanism with parameter α = 1, consider
the following scenario. Let there be four possible answers {a,b, c,d} and n = 10 tasks
with the following correct answers and reports given by workers:
Task Correct Answers for the task
t1 a b, a, a, c
t2 b b, b, b, a
t3 a a, a, b, a
t4 a a, d, a, a
t5 c c, c, a, b
t6 d d, a, d, d
t7 a a, a, c, a
t8 b b, b, a, b
t9 a a, a, a, a
t10 b b, b, a, b
Each of the 10 tasks is solved by four different workers, giving us altogether 40 answers.
For simplicity, we assume that each of the 40 answers is given by a different worker,
that is, a worker solves only one task within the batch of 10 tasks. The collection of
answers gives the following frequency of answers R:
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Answer a b c d
Count 20 12 4 4
R 0.50 0.30 0.1 0.1
Now, consider an additional workerw who is given one of the tasks to solve, but whose
answer is not in the earlier tables. The worker has a choice between three actions:
—Heuristic: Invest no effort and choose an answer that is independent of the task.
—Honest: Invest high effort to find the answer and report it truthfully.
—Strategic: Invest high effort to find the answer, but report an answer that may not
be truthful.
As a rational agent, worker w will choose the action that maximizes the expected
reward, based on what the worker believes about the answers of other workers. In
particular, the expected reward depends on the probability ofmatching the peer answer.
For the heuristic action, the answer x is independent of the task; thus, the probability
of having a matching peer answer is equal to the frequency of this answer among all
tasks, R(x). Therefore, the expected reward is:
R(x) ·
(
1
R(x)
− 1
)
+ (1 − R(x)) · (−1) = 0
no matter what the answer x is, or what the worker believes about R(x). This also
means that any strategy that chooses the answer independently of the specific task
will carry an expected reward of 0.
For the other two actions, the worker solves the task and we assume that the worker
has found an answer x. If the worker believes that the peers are likely to find the same
answer and report it truthfully, the worker should believe that answer x is not less
likely for this task than in the distribution over all tasks. In particular, the worker
should believe that answer x is the one with the highest increase, as given in the self-
predicting condition (Equation (4)). In the example, the answer distributions for the
tasks, grouped by their correct answers, are as follows:
Observed answer
Correct a b c d
a Count(a) 15 2 2 1
f req(·|a) 0.75 0.1 0.1 0.05
b Count(b) 3 9 0 0
f req(·|b) 0.25 0.75 0 0
c Count(c) 1 1 2 0
f req(·|c) 0.25 0.25 0.5 0
d Count(d) 1 0 0 3
f req(·|d) 0.25 0 0 0.75
We can see that, for each group of tasks, it satisfies the self-predicting condition
(Equation (4)).
Let us assume thus that workerw has found answer aand let workerw’s beliefs about
the peers’ answers, for simplicity, be as shown in the table, that is, Pp|w(·|a) = f req(·|a).
It is important to note that worker w does not know the answers of other workers, thus
has to reason about them by taking the expectation over all possibilities. The values
in the table are based on the realization of one possibility. However, they satisfy the
self-predicting condition; thus, they represent one candidate for a worker’s belief.
The reasoning of workerw for the task would be as follows. For reporting the worker’s
true answer a, the probability of matching the peer is 0.75, so worker w expects to get
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a payoff equal to 0.750.5 − 1 = 0.5 for the honest action. This is greater than what the
worker expects to get with the heuristic action (0), or the strategic action with answer
b ( 0.10.3 − 1 = −2/3), c ( 0.10.1 − 1 = 0), or d ( 0.050.1 − 1 = −0.5).
We will show in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 that this holds not only for accurate beliefs,
but for any belief about peer answers that satisfies the self-predicting condition (Equa-
tion (4)). Just like constant rewards, the payment should be scaled so that the expected
reward exceeds the cost of effort invested in solving the task. We will address this
question in Section 4.6.
Now, consider what happens when workers collude, so that, for example, those with
evaluations a and d report a, while those with evaluations b and c report b. In this
case, a worker w with evaluation a believes that the probability of a peer reporting a is
Pp|w(a|a)+ Pp|w(d|a). However, R also has different values than for the honest strategy
profile; R(a) for the colluding strategy profile is equal to R(a) + R(d) for the honest
strategy profile, and exactly compensates for the gain in matching probability. In this
example, workerw’s expected payoff is 0.75+0.050.5+0.1 −1 = 0.33, and is less than what worker
w gets when everybody (including this worker) reports honestly. Thus, the collusion is
not profitable; we show that this holds, in general, in Section 4.4.
Finally, the mechanism is robust against peers that provide low-quality results, as is
common in crowdsourcing. Assume that 10% of workers report honestly, while others
report randomly with probability of reporting a equal to 30%. Then, worker w, whose
evaluation is a, believes that the probability of a peer reporting a is 0.1 · Pp|w(a|a)+0.9 ·
0.3, while R(a) is, in this case, equal to 0.1 · R(a)+ 0.9 · 0.3, where the latter R(a) is the
one calculated for the honest strategy profile. Hence, the expected payoff of worker w
for reporting a is 0.1·0.75+0.9·0.30.1·0.5+0.9·0.3 − 1 = 0.3450.32 − 1, which is more than worker w expects to
obtain for random reporting. With the appropriately scaled payoff, the same holds for
worker w’s profit. Thus, even a small fraction of cooperative workers suffices to create
the right incentives. We will show this more formally in Section 4.3.
The important condition for the discussed collusion-resistant properties to hold is
that workers distinguish tasks only by their endorsed answers (evaluations). If tasks
were distinguished by other features, workers could use those features to form a collud-
ing strategy that is more profitable than honest reporting. Thus, we need to be careful
to apply the mechanism to a batch of tasks that are, on the surface, very similar.
Fortunately, most crowdsourcing tasks satisfy this condition.
2.3. Application Examples
The scenario depicted by Figure 1 captures many interesting crowdsourcing tasks.
These include objective tasks that have correct answers and subjective tasks for which
workers are asked to provide their opinions. We present two examples of such crowd-
sourcing tasks, community (participatory) sensing and peer grading, which we use to
evaluate the quality of the PTSC mechanism.
Community Sensing. In a typical community (participatory) sensing scenario, a
group of sensors measure a physical phenomenon. That is, private mobile devices
equipped with sensors acquire information about a spatially distributed phenomenon,
such as air pollution orweather. Since sensing induces a cost due to the fact that sensing
modules need to be installed and maintained, the party interested in monitoring the
physical phenomenon needs to incentivize the crowd to incur this cost and provide
quality data.
A peculiar property of a community sensing setting is that a mechanism has no con-
trol over sensing devices, nor does it have a way of directly verifying the correctness
of the obtained data. This leads us to peer consistency mechanisms. One of the peer
consistency methods proposed for information elicitation in the community sensing
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setting is the mechanism from Faltings et al. [2014a]. The major drawback of this
mechanism is that noninformed reporting strategies (strategies for which sensors do
not make measurements) can result in significantly higher expected payoffs than hon-
est reporting. We show both theoretically and experimentally that PTSC solves this
problem. In this context, PTSC extends the mechanism from Radanovic and Faltings
[2015a] by allowing a less dense sensor network.
Peer Grading. One of the main challenges in massive open online courses (MOOCs)
is evaluation of student assignments. This is especially true if assignments are essay
questions that cannot be graded automatically. In such cases, peer-grading techniques
can be applied: participants (students) grade assignments of their colleagues, and the
grade of each student is obtained by aggregating the peer grades.
Peer grading in MOOCs represents a typical crowdsourcing scenario, in which work-
ers are students who are assigned to grade their own assignments. A proper monitoring
of such a grading system is not feasible due to the number of participants; thus, quality
control has to be designed in the form of incentives. Moreover, the incentives have to
take into account that participants have different grading abilities and are inclined to
manipulate the reward system.
Often, the quality control in subjective tasks is achieved by using a peer consistency
mechanism that rewards workers when their reports agree [Huang and Fu 2013b].
This type of mechanism, however, does not take into account that workers may have
a potential bias toward more likely evaluations. That is, workers who believe that
their opinion is not the most common are incentivized to misreport. Moreover, collud-
ing strategies in which workers report the same value result in higher payoffs; such
behavior is likely to occur [Gao et al. 2013].
We propose the PTSC as a suitable mechanism for the two crowdsourcing scenarios
due to its strong incentive properties: its ability to cope with collusive behavior while
making honest reporting the most profitable equilibrium.
3. FORMAL SETTING
Our crowdsourcingmodel is similar to the one presented inDasgupta andGhosh [2013],
with the basic structure depicted by Figure 1. We formalize it in the following way.
3.1. Tasks
We consider a crowdsourcing scenario in which a group of workers solves n statistically
independent tasks from a set of a priori similar tasks T = {t1, t2, . . .}, and are rewarded
based on their performance. Tasks are a prior similar if they are only distinguished by
their correct answers; examples are collecting sensor measurements at different loca-
tions, grading student answers to the same question, or interpreting similar images.
We thus identify a task t with its correct answer Xtcorrect that is generated randomly
according to a distribution function defined over a discrete and finite answer space
X = {x, y, z, . . .}. Note that the existence of a correct answer does not necessarily re-
strict applicability of the proposed approach to eliciting objective information. Models
of obtaining (subjective) preferences over alternatives often assume that preferences
are noisy evaluations of the true state of the world (e.g., the random utility model
[Soufiani et al. 2012]). The only important consideration that needs to be taken into
account is that a correct answer Xtcorrect is not accessible to a mechanism, while the
answers of different workers to the same task should have some minimal correlation
(in our case, expressed by the self-predicting condition).
Each task in set T is answered by at least 2 different workers, randomly chosen
from a large pool W = {w, p,q, . . .} of available workers. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that a worker w solves only one task tw in a family of tasks T . If this
assumption does not hold within set T , we simply partition T into subsets that satisfy
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the assumption, and apply a reward mechanism to each subset separately. The overall
reward of a worker w can then be defined as an average or a sum of the obtained
rewards.
3.2. Workers
A worker in W is assumed to be a risk-neutral rational agent who aims to maximize
expected profit. With that in mind, our crowdsourcing setting can be viewed as a
two-stage game, in which in the first-stage workers choose the amount of effort they
want to invest in solving their task, and in the second stage, they decide on what to
report.
When a worker w solves a task, that worker invests a certain amount of effort ew. We
assume two levels of effort, high and low; low effort, denoted as e0, should intuitively
be seen as a random answer, provided automatically, without understanding the task;
high effort (e1), on the other hand, is the work exerted by an honest worker who
does one’s reasonable best to answer the task correctly. When the rewards offered by
the requester are insufficient to cover the cost of high effort, workers may choose an
approximate strategy whose effort falls in between these extremes. To simplify the
analysis, we would consider this intended effort the high-effort case, thus consider only
strategies with either low or high effort. Unlike accuracy, workers’ utility decreases as
their effort increases, meaning that a worker w experiences cost cw(ew) for investing
effort ew—cost cw is an increasing function of effort ew, that is, cw(e0) < cw(e1), and can
be different for different workers.
In many real scenarios, tasks can be solved with multiple levels of effort accord-
ing to a possibly very complex cost–benefit relation. We do not consider the ques-
tion of designing mechanisms to encourage intermediate levels of effort to optimize
cost-effectiveness. We note that, by scaling the reward function—in PTSC, increasing
parameter α—it is possible to incentivize higher levels of effort.
When a worker solves a task, that worker obtains an evaluation of the correct answer
to the task, which we model as a random variable Xw that takes values from the set of
possible answers X . Note that worker w’s evaluation Xw does not have to be equal to
the correct answer Xtwcorrect. In order to formally define workers’ action space, we extend
answer space X by adding the symbol ∅, meaning that a worker w whose evaluation
Xw is equal to ∅ has not solved the task (i.e., ew = e0).
Once worker w solves the task, that worker reports an answer to the mechanism.
Reported value Yw can differ from evaluation Xw, either because worker w lies or
because worker w does not solve the task (Xw = ∅). We see that a worker w faces a
choice between three basic strategies:
—Honest: Invest high effort e1 to obtain evaluation Xw = x, and report honestly Yw = x.
—Strategic: Invest high effort e1 to obtain evaluation Xw = x, but report Yw = y that is
randomly generated according to a distribution Qw|w(y|x). Naturally, honest strategy
is equal to strategic strategy for Qw|w(y|x) = 1y=x, where 1cond is an indicator variable
equal to 1 when condition cond is satisfied, and otherwise is 0.
—Heuristic: Invest low effort e0 (i.e., Xw = ∅) and report according to a distribution
Qw|w(y|∅). Note that this strategy includes both random reporting and heuristic re-
porting in which workers agree which values to report in advance (e.g., they all report
the same value).
All the three strategies can be described using probability distribution function Qw|w.
Intuitively, workers’ strategies are either based on their evaluations or are heuristic
(random) if workers choose not to invest high effort in solving tasks. In principle, each
worker can have one’s own strategy. However, because there is a large pool of workers
and workers are randomly assigned to tasks, we can restrict our attention to symmetric
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strategies and abuse our notation by denoting symmetric strategy profiles with honest,
strategic, and heuristic. Namely, from a worker w’s perspective, asymmetric strategies
of other workers q can be seen as symmetric strategies with Qq|q obtained by averaging
workers q’s strategies. Hence, honest strategy profile has effectively the same properties
even when workers are allowed to have asymmetric strategies.
3.3. Workers’ Beliefs
Workers’ beliefs are characterized by two distributions that need not be the same for
different workers. A prior belief of a worker w is a probability distribution function
Pq(x) = Pr(Xq = x) regarding the evaluation Xq of a randomly chosen worker q who
has solved an arbitrary task in T . A posterior belief of a worker w is a probability
distribution Pp|w(x|y) = Pr(Xp = x|Xw = y) regarding the evaluation Xp of a worker p
who has solved the same task. In particular, when worker w solves a task, that worker
also gains an insight regarding the evaluation of a worker p; thus, worker w updates a
prior belief Pp(x) to obtain a posterior belief Pp|w(x|y) = Pr(Xp = x|Xw = y).
The consequence of tasks inT being statistically independent implies that Pq|w(x|y) =
Pq(x) for a worker q who has solved a different task than worker w. We call workers
p peers, and workers q reference workers of worker w. Because tasks are randomly
distributed to workers from a large pool W ,2 prior belief regarding peers’ evaluations
is equal to prior belief regarding the evaluations of reference workers, that is, Pp(x) =
Pq(x). Moreover, when Xw = ∅ (i.e., ew = 0), worker w gains no insight into peers’
evaluations; thus, Pp|w(x|∅) = Pp(x).
We assume workers’ beliefs to be fully mixed, meaning that for any two workers w
and p, we have that ∀x, y ∈ X : Pp(x) > 0, Pp|w(x|y) > 0. This is a common assumption
in many similar settings (e.g., Miller et al. [2005] and Prelec [2004]); it states that
workers believe that all answers can be endorsed by their potential peers.
The expected payoff of a worker w depends on the reports of peers and reference
workers rather than on their evaluations. Therefore, worker w’s beliefs regarding eval-
uations (Pp, Pp|w, and Pq), need to be transformed into the beliefs regarding other work-
ers’ reports, here denoted by Qp, Qp|w, and Qq. Using the fact that Qp|p defines worker
p’s strategy, we obtain that the proper transformations for a strategic strategy profile
are Qq(y) = Qp(y) =
∑
z∈X Qp|p(y|z)Pp(z) and Qp|w(y|x) =
∑
z∈X Qp|p(y|z)Pp|w(z|x). When
workers use the honest strategy profile, Qq, Qp, and Qp|w(y|x) reduce to Qq = Qp = Pp
and Qp|w = Pp|w. For a heuristic strategy profile, we obtain Qq = Qp = Qp|w = Qp|p.
Since rewards are based on the comparison of reports, some minimal correlation
between workers’ evaluations must exist. We incorporate this correlation in the work-
ers’ belief systems by assuming the self-predicting condition [Jurca and Faltings 2011;
Radanovic and Faltings 2013]:
Definition 3.1. Consider workers w and pwho solve the same task. A worker w has
a belief system that satisfies the self-predicting condition iff 3
Pp|w(y|x)
Pp(y)
− 1 < Pp|w(x|x)
Pp(x)
− 1,∀y = x.
2This translates to having workers whose proficiencies (qualities) are i.i.d. random variables, in which the
proficiency of a worker might be known to that worker, but not to the other workers. Proficiency can be
thought of as a probability of obtaining the correct evaluation.
3We keep −1 on both sides to make the proofs and the notion of the self-predictor clear.
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Moreover, for worker w, whose beliefs satisfy the self-predicting condition, we define
self-predictor w as the smallest number in [0,1] so that
Pp|w(y|x)
Pp(y)
− 1 <
(
Pp|w(x|x)
Pp(x)
− 1
)
· w,∀y = x (5)
holds.
The self-prediction holds in the common case in which a worker believes that only
the evaluation one is endorsing is more likely than in the prior distribution, as all other
evaluations would become less likely. This also includes binary answer spaces (as in
Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013]), as well as a more general case when workers observe
different samples drawn from the same categorical distribution, but with unknown
parameters sampled from a Dirichlet distribution. If a worker w uses Bayesian updat-
ing, that worker’s posterior Pp|w is greater than the prior Pp only for the worker’s own
evaluation, implying the self-predicting condition. Note that, in this case, Pp|w(x|x) can
be less than Pp|w(y|x) for y = x. In the following 2 scenarios, the self-prediction possibly
holds, although a worker might believe that others may answer differently:
—when a worker’s evaluation is a priori unlikely, such as receiving bad service from a
hotel that is otherwise very highly rated, and
—when there are strongly correlated values, for example, when measuring a tempera-
ture of 26 degrees, answers of 25 and 27 degrees will also be very likely.
We characterize the degree of correlation that a worker w believes to be possible by
the self-predictorw: the smaller it is, the more proficient workers are, that is, different
answer values are less correlated. For example, w = 0 indicates that different answer
values are not correlated, while for w ≈ 1 workers are more likely to confuse two
similar answers.
To model possible differences in workers’ beliefs, we assign to each worker w a belief
type θP,w. Belief type θP,w is an element of an abstract set P ; it determines how
beliefs Pp and Pp|w are formed. We call belief type θP,w of a worker w admissible if the
associated beliefs Pp and Pp|w comply with the conditions described in this section (the
self-predicting condition included).
3.4. Subjective Equilibrium
As a rational agent, a worker aims to maximize profit; in case of uncertainties, the
worker is assumed to maximize expected profit. Since a worker’s payoff depends on
what other workers report, we use an equilibrium analysis to determine the result-
ing behavior of workers. In particular, a strategy profile σ = (σw, σp, σq, . . .), which
represents a collection of strategies of workers {w, p,q, . . .}, is an equilibrium if for
any worker w¯ ∈ {w, p,q, . . .}, the worker’s expected profit is maximized when adopting
strategy σw¯, that is, σw¯ is the best response. An equilibrium is strict if any other strat-
egy σ ′w¯ = σw¯ leads to a strictly lower expected profit. If a mechanism admits honest
reporting as an equilibrium, we say that it is incentive compatible.
Since beliefs need not be common among workers, that is, they are subjective, we are
particularly interested in an equilibrium concept called ex-post subjective equilibrium
(Witkowski and Parkes [2012a]), which is defined over admissible belief types. In this
equilibrium concept, a worker’s best response is independent of the belief types of
other workers. The crowdsourcing model has the form of a two-stage game; thus, in
our analysis we use a refinement of an ex-post subjective equilibrium that we call
perfect ex-post subjective equilibrium. Here, perfect means that a worker chooses at
each stage a strategy that is in expectation the best response to the strategies of other
workers according to one’s current beliefs. In our case, a worker would first calculate
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whether, according to one’s prior belief, one can expect to profit from investing high
effort. If profit can be expected, the worker would solve the task, update one’s belief
with respect to the evaluation, and choose the best answer to report. If not, the worker
would simply report the best answer according to prior belief. For simplicity, we omit
the full name of the equilibrium concept in the remaining part of the article.
4. ANALYZING THE PEER TRUTH SERUM FOR CROWDSOURCING
In Section 2, we introduced the PTSC mechanism with the reward function:
τ (xw, xp) = α ·
(
τ0(xw, xp) − 1
)
τ0(xw, xp) =
{ 1
Rw(xw)
if xw = xp
0 if xw = xp
,
which is applicable when a large quantity of statistically independent tasks can be used
for constructing R. Note that the PTSC score τ (xw, xp) might take negative values. To
avoid negative rewards, one can additionally reward workers with α. However, we keep
the form (1) to relate PTSC to the mechanism that elicits proper values of parameter
α, presented later in the article.
The key concept for analyzing PTSC in game theoretic terms is workers’ expected
reward. Suppose that worker w believes that the other workers are honest. In that
case, worker w expects that the frequency of reports equal to y within the task tw is
Pp|w(y|x), where the evaluation of worker w is x (see Section 3.3). On the other hand,
the expected frequency of reports equal to y within a task t = tw not solved by worker
w is Pq(y) = Pp(y). Therefore, for a large set of tasks, the expected score of worker w
for reporting y is approximately equal to
α ·
(
Pp|w(y|x)
Pp(y)
− 1
)
.
The claim follows from the law of large numbers and the statistical independence of
tasks. Similarly, when workers adopt a strategy described by a distribution Qp|p (strate-
gic or heuristic strategies), we obtain that worker w’s belief regarding the frequency of
reports equal to y within the task tw is Qp|w(y|x) =
∑
z∈X Qp|p(y|z)Pp|w(z|x). Worker w’s
belief regarding the frequency of reports equal to y within a task t = tw not solved by
worker w is Qq(y) = Qp(y) =
∑
z∈X Qp|p(y|z)Pp(z). Thus, the expected score of worker w
for reporting y is approximately equal to
α ·
(
Qp|w(y|x)
Qp(y)
− 1
)
when Qp(y) > 0 and −α when Qp(y) = 0, as, in that case, a peer does not report y.
By analyzing the structure of workers’ expected scores for different strategies, we
can deduce several properties of the PTSC mechanism:
—The expected payoff of a worker w who invests high effort, obtains evaluation x, and
who believes that the other workers are honest, for reporting x is α · ( Pp|w(x|x)Pp(x) −1). Due
to the self-predicting condition (even with the self-predictor w ≈ 1), this is greater
than what the worker expects to obtain for reporting y = x:
α ·
(
Pp|w(x|x)
Pp(x)
− 1
)
> α ·
(
Pp|w(y|x)
Pp(y)
− 1
)
.
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Moreover, the honest reporting strategy leads to a strictly positive expected payoff
because Pp|w(x|x)Pp(x) > 1. By choosing an appropriate scaling parameter α, one can cover
the cost of effort c(e1), making the payment scheme ex-ante individually rational.
—When workers adopt a heuristic strategy profile (investing low effort), their expected
payoff for reporting y is equal to 0, because Qp|w = Qp (see Section 3.3). This is
in contrast to the honest reporting strategy profile in which the expected payoff is
greater than 0. Therefore, by appropriately scaling parameter α, one can overcome
the problem of having the higher cost for investing effort (c(e1) > c(e0)) and incentivize
workers to invest effort. This further implies that honest reporting is an equilibrium
strategy.
—Finally, we can analyze if workers can manipulate the mechanism in order to ob-
tain higher payoffs. Suppose workers adopt a strategic strategy profile, that is, each
worker p obtains a private evaluation xp, but reports according to a distribution
Qp|p(·|xp). In that case, the expected payoff of worker w whose evaluation is x for
reporting y, is equal to
α ·
(
Qp|w(y|x)
Qp(y)
− 1
)
= α ·
(∑
z Qp|p(y|z) · Pp|w(z|x)∑
z Qp|p(y|z) · Pp(z)
− 1
)
when Qp|p(y|z) > 0 for some z ∈ X . This follows from the definitions of Qp|w and
Qp. Assuming the self-predicting condition (even with the self-predictor w ≈ 1), the
expression is maximized when Qp|p(z¯|z) = 1σˆ (z)=z¯ with σˆ (x) = y, where σˆ is a bijective
function from the set of possible evaluations to the set of possible reports. Namely,
the earlier expression can be written as
α ·
(
Qp|p(y|x) · Pp|w(x|x) +
∑
z=x Qp|p(y|z) · Pp|w(z|x)
Qp|p(y|x) · Pp(x) +
∑
z=x Qp|p(y|z) · Pp(z)
− 1
)
= α ·
⎛
⎝Qp|p(y|x) · Pp(x) · Pp|w(x|x)Pp(x) +
∑
z=x Qp|p(y|z) · Pp|w(z|x)Pp(z) · Pp(z)
Qp|p(y|x) · Pp(x) +
∑
z=x Qp|p(y|z) · Pp(z)
− 1
⎞
⎠
≤ α ·
⎛
⎝Qp|p(y|x) · Pp(x) · Pp|w(x|x)Pp(x) +
∑
z=x Qp|p(y|z) · Pp|w(x|x)Pp(x) · Pp(z)
Qp|p(y|x) · Pp(x) +
∑
z=x Qp|p(y|z) · Pp(z)
− 1
⎞
⎠
= α ·
(
Pp|w(x|x)
Pp(x)
− 1
)
,
where the inequality comes from the self-predicting condition and is strict if there
exists z = x such that Qp|p(y|z) > 0. Since the honest reporting strategy profile can
be described by σˆ (x) = x and results in a payoff equal to α · ( Pp|w(x|x)Pp(x) − 1), we conclude
that the maximum payoff is obtained for honest reporting. The same holds for profit
if α is properly chosen.
The PTSC mechanism with reward function (1) assumes a large number of statis-
tically similar tasks, which is often satisfied in practice. In the following sections, we
adopt this approach to construct a more robust version of the PTSC mechanism, which
also operates with a smaller number of statistically independent tasks. Therefore, we
provide a formal analysis only for the more general version of the PTSC mechanism.
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ALGORITHM 2: The Robust Peer Truth Serum for Crowdsourcing
Reward each worker w using the following mechanism:
(1) Consider n− 1 tasks in addition to task tw, where n is big enough to allow desirable
properties (see Theorem 4.3, Theorem 4.7, and Section 4.5).
(2) Randomly sample n reports from n different tasks, including the task tw, but not worker w’s
report.
(3) Calculate the frequency of reported values within this sample Rw(x) = num(x)∑
y∈X num(y)
, where
num is the function that counts occurrences of reported values in the sample.
(4) Worker w is rewarded for reporting Yw = xw with the score
τ (xw, xp) =
{
α ·
(
1xw=xp
Rw (xw )
− 1
)
if Rw(xw) = 0
0 if Rw(xw) = 0
, (6)
where 1xw=xp is an indicator variable (equal to 1 if xw = xp, and 0 otherwise) and α is a
constant strictly greater than 0. xp is the report of worker w’s peer, who solves task tw and
whose report is in the sample from which Rw was obtained.
4.1. Robust Peer Truth Serum for Crowdsourcing
In the PTSC mechanism from the previous section, reports from all workers were used
to calculate statistic R. In general, this might not lead to a proper result if one task is
solved by significantly more workers than other tasks. To avoid this issue, we sample
an answer from each task and construct R from the obtained sample.
Since R is calculated from a finite number of samples, it is possible that R(x) is equal
to 0 for a certain report x, which would lead to an ill-defined score due to the division by
0. To overcome this problem, we distinguish values x when the statistic R(x) is equal
to 0. When R(x) = 0, a worker who reports x obtains a score proportional to 1R(x) − 1 if
one’s peer has also reported x, and a score proportional to −1 otherwise. On the other
hand, if R(x) = 0, a worker who reports x obtains 0, since there is no peer that matches
the worker’s report. As we will see later, this definition ensures us that workers who
invest low effort are indifferent between reporting any two different answers, which is
important when it comes to suppressing heuristic reporting strategies.
More formally, we define the Robust Peer Truth Serum for Crowdsourcing (RPTSC)
as a mechanism that follows the steps of Algorithm 2.
Although RPTSC is a nonlinear scheme, the expected score can be expressed in a
closed form.
LEMMA 4.1. The expected payoff of worker w with evaluation Xw = x and report
Yw = y in the RPTSC mechanism is equal to{
α ·
(
Qp|w(y|x)
Qp(y)
− 1
)
· (1 − (1 − Qp(y))n−1) if Qp(y) > 0
0 if Qp(y) = 0
, (7)
where n is the number of tasks.
An important property to satisfy is a resilience toward heuristic (random) reporting,
meaning that, in expectation, a mechanism should not reward workers who invest
low effort, regardless of their reporting strategy. The following proposition shows that
RPTSC satisfies this property.
PROPOSITION 4.2. In the RPTSC mechanism, the expected payoff of a worker w with a
heuristic strategy is equal to 0 and that worker’s profit is equal to −cw(e0).
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In order to incentivize workers to invest high effort, their expected payoff for invest-
ing high effort should be strictly greater than when they report randomly. Suppose
that all workers adopt the honest strategy. We denote by τ¯w(α) the expected payoff of a
worker w before the worker evaluates a task, that is:
τ¯w(α) = EXw=x
(
α ·
(
Pp|w(x|x)
Pp(x)
− 1
)
· (1 − (1 − Pp(x))n−1)
)
, (8)
where the expectation EXw=x is taken over worker w’s possible evaluations x ∈ X . It
is important to note that, here, all workers, including worker w, adopt a strategy of
investing high effort e1 and truthful reporting. This differs from random reporting
strategies, in which workers invest low effort e0 and are expected to obtain payoffs
equal to 0. Also, note that τ¯w(α), which represents worker w’s expected payoff prior to
evaluation, depends on parameter α.
4.2. Incentive Compatibility
When workers agree to invest high effort e1 and report honestly, a worker w might
find it more profitable to deviate, as investing high effort increases the cost. In order
to prevent such deviations, a mechanism should cover the cost of investing high effort;
in RPTSC, this can be done by properly scaling parameter α.
THEOREM 4.3. Suppose that for all workers w and answers x ∈ X , parameter α and
the number of tasks n satisfy
τ¯w(α) > cw(e1) − cw(e0)
1 − (1 − Pq(x))n−1
1 − Pq(x)n−1 ≥ w (9)
where w is the self-predictor of worker w. Then, the RPTSC mechanism admits the
honest reporting strategy profile as a strict equilibrium.
It is interesting to note that reporting according to a strategy profile strategic defined
by Qw|w(y|x) = 1y=σˆ (x), where σˆ is a bijective function σˆ : X → X from the answer space
to the set of reports, is also an equilibrium, provided that the conditions of Theorem 4.3
hold. For example, bijection σˆ could define that workers with evaluation x report y,
while those with evaluation y report x. This symmetry comes from Lemma 4.1 and
the fact that Qp(σˆ (y)) = Pp(y) and Qp|w(σˆ (y)|x) = Pp|w(y|x). We call this property
permutation indifference, which implies that the equilibrium strategies defined by
Qw|w(y|x) = 1y=σˆ (x) achieve the same expected profits as the honest strategy profile.
However, these strategies require costly coordination without any benefit.
4.3. Low-Effort Aversion
Although RPTSC admits noninformed equilibria, Proposition 4.2 shows that workers
are not expected to profit in these equilibria. In fact, the direct consequence of Proposi-
tion 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 is that a low-effort strategy profile results in lower expected
profits than the honest strategy profile for an appropriately scaled parameter α, even
if the low-effort strategy is a mixture of investing high and low effort.
LEMMA 4.4. Suppose that Condition (9) of Theorem 4.3 holds. Any equilibrium of
RPTSC in which a heuristic strategy is adopted (played) with nonzero probability, that
is, where a worker w’s effort ew can be equal to ew = e0, leads to lower expected profits
than the honest reporting strategy profile.
With RPTSC, one can achieve even more. Suppose that a population of workers
contains a certain number of workers who invest high effort and report their true
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evaluations, and other workers whose strategies are based on low effort. Then, RPTSC
can be properly scaled so that the best response to this scenario is to invest high
effort. This means that a fraction of at least β honest workers can be used to eliminate
low-effort equilibria. We call this property low-effort aversion.
Definition 4.5. Consider a parameter β ∈ (0,1] and a strategy profile that is a
mixture of the honest and heuristic strategies, in which the honest strategy is adopted
(played) with probability γ . A mechanism is β-low-effort averse if it does not admit the
mixed-strategy profile as an equilibrium for any γ such that β ≤ γ ≤ 1.
PROPOSITION 4.6. Suppose that scaling parameter α is such that
α >
cw(e1) − cw(e0)
β · EXw=x[Pp|w(x|x) − Pp(x)]
(10)
for all workers w, where EXw=x is the expectation over possible evaluations of a worker
w. Then, RPTSC is β-low-effort averse.
4.4. Optimality
Many payment schemes are not resistant to collusive strategies in which all workers
report identical values; often, these strategies lead to considerably greater payoffs than
the honest-reporting strategy profile. One can easily show by using Lemma 4.1 that
the expected payoff of a strategy profile in which workers report a single value is equal
to 0 in the RPTSC mechanism. Since it is more profitable for workers to invest high
effort and report honestly, we can say that appropriately scaled RPTSC is resistant
to collusion based on reporting a single value. However, it is reasonable to ask how
good the honest-reporting equilibrium is compared to the optimal strategy profile. The
following theorem gives a condition for the optimality of honest reporting.
THEOREM 4.7. Suppose that for all workers w and answers x ∈ X , parameter α and
the number of tasks n satisfy
τ¯w(α) > cw(e1) − cw(e0)(
1 − (n− 1) · Pp(x) · (1 − Pp(x))
n−2
1 − (1 − Pp(x))n−1
)
≥ w
, (11)
where w is the self-predictor of worker w. Then, the honest reporting strategy profile is
a strict equilibrium of the RPTSC mechanism that results in the maximum profit.
Condition (11) is stricter than Condition (9) in a sense that any self-predictor w
that satisfies Condition (11) necessarily satisfies Condition (9).
LEMMA 4.8. If for all workers w and answers x ∈ X , self-predictor w satisfies
Condition (11), then it also satisfies Condition (9).
Both Conditions (9) and (11), as well as the expected payoff (Equation (7)), depend
on the number of tasks n and self-predictor w. It is easy to show that the bounds
on w in Conditions (9) and (11) are greater than or equal to 0. Since answer values
are anticorrelated for a binary answer space, increase in belief for one answer value
corresponds to the decrease in belief for another answer value. This means that, in a
binary setting, Conditions (9) and (11) are satisfied regardless of n and w. In the next
section, we show how the number of tasks influences the amount of positive correlation
allowed between different answer values of a nonbinary answer space.
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4.5. Limiting Cases with the Number of Tasks n = 2 and n → ∞
We first examine the case when there is only one task in addition to a task tw solved by
a worker w. The expected payoff of a worker w with evaluation x for reporting y is, in
that case, equal to
α ·
(
Qp|w(y|x)
Qp(y)
− 1
)
· (1 − (1 − Qp(y))) = α ·
(
Qp|w(y|x) − Qp(y)
)
.
This means that, for n = 2, the RPTSC score is in expectation equivalent to the linear
score
τ (xw, xp) = α · (1xw=xp − R′w(xw)), (12)
where R′w(xw) = 2 · (Rw(xw) − 1xw=xp2 ) = 1xw=xq , that is, R′w(xw) is constructed by sam-
pling one report from the task not solved by worker w. The requirement for incentive
compatibility of this score is
Pp|w(y|x) − Pp(y) < Pp|w(x|x) − Pp(x),∀y = x.
That is, a worker’s belief change from prior to posterior should be largest for the answer
equal to the worker’s evaluation. However, the condition for optimality (Condition (11))
imposes a restriction that different answer values are anticorrelated, that is:
Pp|w(y|x) − Pp(y) < 0,∀y = x.
Although Condition (11) is only a sufficient condition of Theorem 4.7, it is actually
tight for n = 2. Namely, if the condition did not hold, workers with evaluations x
and y, and beliefs Pp|w(y|x) − Pp(y) > 0 and Pp|w(x|y) − Pp(x) > 0, would be better
off reporting the same value (e.g., all report x or y) than reporting honestly. This
comes from the fact that their expected payoff with such a collusive behavior would
be Pp|w(x|x) + Pp|w(y|x) − Pp(x) − Pp(y) ≥ Pp|w(x|x) − Pp(x) and Pp|w(x|y) + Pp|w(y|y) −
Pp(x) − Pp(y) ≥ Pp|w(y|y) − Pp(y), respectively, for workers with evaluations x and y.
With a larger number of tasks, we obtain that RPTSC mechanism has the same
incentive compatibility requirements as the PTSC mechanism with reward function
(1) - in that sense they are equivalent. In particular, the RPTSC requirements for
incentive compatibility and optimality now coincide and are equal to the self-predicting
condition with an unconstrained self-predictor w ∈ [0,1]. This means that for a larger
number of tasks our mechanism allows a (bounded) positive correlation between two
different answer values.
We see that a mechanism has to decide on an appropriate number of tasks to allow
correlated answer values. To do this, it does not need knowledge about workers’ beliefs,
only estimates regarding the minimal value of priors minw,z Pp(z) and the maximal
value of self-predictors maxw w among all workers w. The only restriction is that
minw,z Pp(z) is not overestimated and maxw w is not underestimated. For example,
one could incrementally take tasks into account, one by one, until workers’ responses
clearly indicate the minimal value of minw,z Pp(z), determined by the frequency of the
least frequent report, and themaximal value ofmaxw w, determined by the correlation
among different reports.
Conditions (9) and (11) specify the upper bound on correlations among different
answer values, described by self-predictor w, that implies incentive compatibility and
optimality, given the number of tasks n. In the following table, we show how quickly
the upper bound of Condition (11) approaches 1 as the number of tasks grows. Since,
by Lemma 4.8, Condition (11) is stricter than Condition (9), the upper bound applies
for both conditions. Clearly, for a reasonable number of tasks n, the bound allows
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significant correlation among different answers, even for the prior with values as small
as 0.05.
n minz Pp(z) = 0.05 minz Pp(z) = 0.1 minz Pp(z) = 0.2
10 w ≤ 0.19 w ≤ 0.36 w ≤ 0.65
30 w ≤ 0.55 w ≤ 0.84 w ≤ 0.98
60 w ≤ 0.84 w ≤ 0.98 w ≤ 1
100 w ≤ 0.96 w ≤ 1 w ≤ 1
We have seen that RPTSC reduces to a simple linear score when statistic R is calcu-
lated based on only one task in addition to the task being solved by aworkerw. The form
of the score (12) is similar to the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism introduced in Dasgupta
and Ghosh [2013]. In fact, they are equivalent (see Section C in the Online Appendix),
which means that the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism is a special case of RPTSC score
obtained in the limit case when R is calculated from only two tasks. Moreover, the
equivalence implies that the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism requires noncorrelated an-
swer values for the honest-reporting strategy profile to result in the maximum profit.
4.6. Eliciting the Scaling Parameter of RPTSC
In the RPTSC, the expected reward for an honest answer, obtained by exerting effort,
exceeds that for a heuristic answer by a positive margin. Using the scaling parameter
α, this margin can be scaled so that it exceeds the cost of high effort. In this case, the
expected reward for a heuristic strategy can be kept at 0, thus discouraging low effort
workers from participating in the mechanism. We now show that it is possible to elicit
a proper value of this parameter, for which workers who participate in solving tasks
are incentivized to invest high effort.
Let us assume that strategies based on low effort induce some cost c(e0) > 0. This
can be interpreted, for example, as a cost of reporting. In order to achieve desirable
properties, the RPTSC parameter α needs to be properly adjusted, so that the a
priori expected payoff for investing high effort and honest reporting τ¯w(α) satisfies
τ¯w(α) > c(e1) − c(e0). Although prescreening methods could be used to obtain proper
scaling parameters, as discussed in Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013], we show how one
can make use of potentially negative rewards in order to elicit the values of scaling
parameters that would cover the cost of high effort.4
One way to elicit a proper value of α is by using auctioning, similar to
Papakonstantinou et al. [2011]. We define the following two-step protocol:
(1) The mechanism asks workers to report the parameter αw of the RPTSCmechanism
that would recover their costs. After collecting their reports, it calculates αˆ such
that π proportion of declared αws is greater than αˆ. Then, every worker with αw
lower than αˆ proceeds to the next stage.
(2) Workers solve their tasks, report their answers, and are rewarded according to the
RPTSC mechanism with α = αˆ.
To apply the protocol, we should have at least  21−π  or more workers per task, where
π ∈ (0,1). This guarantees that we have at least two workers per task when we
execute RPTSC in the second stage of the mechanism, after removing a π proportion
of the workers in the first phase.
4Negative rewards can, for example, be implemented by requesting that workers pay α for participation,
then reward them with τ (xw, xp) + α, where τ is defined by RPTSC.
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Because a worker would never announce a parameter αi that leads to a negative
profit, the two-step protocol is ex-ante individual rational and preserves the properties
of the RPTSC.
PROPOSITION 4.9. Consider workers with nontransferable utilities (payments). Suppose
that c(e0) > 0 and let τ¯w(α) be a priori expected payoff of workerw in the honest-reporting
equilibrium. Then, reporting in the first-stage αw such that τ¯w(αw) = cw(e1), and using
the honest-strategy profile in the second stage is an equilibrium of the two-step protocol.
Note that, if workers are allowed to transfer their payments, then the auctioning
model is not resilient to collusion. However, we can put a lower bound on the percentage
of workers necessary to make a successful coalition by setting parameter π , which
defines αˆ, large enough. Indeed, in a realistic scenario, only a certain percentage of
workers would form such coalitions. Thus, by having large π , we can avoid this type of
collusion.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the properties of the PTSC mechanisms in two crowd-
sourcing domains, community sensing and peer grading, focusing on two aspects: its
manipulation resistance to collusive behavior and its effectiveness to elicit quality in-
formation. The analysis is done on a less robust version of the PTSC mechanism that
requires a larger number of tasks, which usually holds in the proposed applications.
5.1. PTSC in Community Sensing
As an example of a community-sensing scenario, consider air-quality monitoring over
an urban area. In order to use the PTSC mechanism, we need to identify the set
of statistically independent tasks. Since air pollution is a localized phenomenon, we
can define a set of tasks as measuring levels of air pollution at locations that are
significantly away from each other. Assuming that measurements at these locations
are conditionally independent given a global state, here denoted by , we can apply
the PTSC mechanisms in a similar fashion as described in Section 2. Global state 
is modeled as a random variable that takes values in a finite discrete set {γ1, γ2, . . .}.
Note that the global state  does not describe how local variations influence a sensor’s
measurement at a certain location. For example, it might capture the fact that high
humidity over an urban area increases the measured levels of air pollution, but it does
not capture the fact that some places might have events such as traffic jams or fires.
We further assume that the self-predicting condition holds regardless of the global
state , that is:
Pp|w(y|x,  = γ )
Pp(y| = γ ) − 1 <
Pp|w(x|x,  = γ )
Pp(x| = γ ) − 1,∀γ ∈ {γ1, γ2, . . .}, y = x.
In other words, the highest relative increase in a sensor’s belief is obtained for the
observed value. This condition is natural due to the fact that it describes the significance
of sensors’ measurements. With this in mind, we can reward a sensor using the PTSC
mechanism with the following structure:
(1) For a sensor w that reports xw, from a neighboring set of sensors (sensors located
in the vicinity of sensor w), select a peer sensor p.
(2) Calculate the frequency of reports equal to xw among reference sensors ρ (|ρ| >> 1),
that include peer sensor p, but are not each other’s neighbors:
R(xw) = 1|ρ|
∑
s∈ρ
1xw=xs .
(3) Reward sensor w with the PTSC mechanism of the form (1).
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Since the reference sensors ρ are not each other’s peers, their measurements are
conditionally independent given . Therefore, using the same reasoning as in the
previous sections, we conclude that the expected payoff of sensor w, who observes x, for
reporting y is approximately
α ·
⎛
⎝ ∑
γ∈{γ1,γ2,...}
Pr( = γ |x) · Pp|w(y|x,  = γ )
Pp(y| = γ ) − 1
⎞
⎠
provided that the other sensors are honest. Similarly, when sensors adopt a strategy
that is described by a distribution Qp|p, the expected payoff of sensor w for reporting y
is approximately
α ·
⎛
⎝ ∑
γ∈{γ1,γ2,...}
Pr( = γ |x) · Qp|w(y|x,  = γ )
Qp(y| = γ ) − 1
⎞
⎠ .
Since Pp|w(y|x,=γ )Pp(y|=γ ) satisfies the self-prediction for any global state γ , it is clear that the
mechanism has the same properties as the PTSC mechanism presented in Section 2.
In order to apply the PTSC mechanism, one needs to find a peer measurement. In
pollution sensing, we will rarely have two sensors in the same place; thus, we may
use an artificial value constructed from the values reported by neighboring sensors.
The simplest criteria for selecting neighbors would be to choose the m closest sensors.
However, pollution can vary strongly due to differences in land use: a busy street will
have much higher pollution than a forest next to it, even though the locations may be
very close. This can be captured most accurately by models of pollution propagation,
as we have done in earlier work [Faltings et al. 2014a]. In this experiment, we chose
a simpler solution in which we just select one peer sensor in a location with similar
characteristics. Finally, the center determines reference sensors ρ for each sensor.While
this process can be a random selection with the constraint that reference sensors are
not neighbors, in practice, one can consider ρ to be the set of all sensors, without
affecting any incentive properties. Namely, it suffices that R(x) converges to Pp(x|),
which is for |ρ| >> 1 naturally satisfied in the considered setting.
We examine the characteristics of the presented PTSC using realistic data of nitrogen
dioxide (NO2) concentrations over the city of Strasbourg. The data consists of both real
measurements collected by ASPA5 and estimations of pollution from the physical model
ADMS Urban V2.3 [Colvile et al. 2002]. In total, the dataset contains concentrations
of NO2 for each hour, expressed in parts per million (ppm), at 116 different locations
over a period of 4 weeks.
Although the initial measurements take values in continuous domain, we discretize
it using four levels of pollution defined as
—low: concentrations 0 − 20 ppb;
—medium: concentrations 20 − 40 ppb;
—high: concentrations 40 − 60 ppb;
—extrahigh: concentrations 60 − ∞ ppb.
Each hour, sensors report themeasured level of pollution to the center and are rewarded
with the PTSCmechanism (with constant α = 10). As a criterion for neighbor selection,
we consider distance and define neighbors of a certain sensor as 10 closest sensors. In
peer selection, we effectively simulate the prior knowledge of the center by identifying
5www.atmo-alsace.net.
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Table I. Average Payoffs (Stat. Sensors)
Strategy Mean Min Max Median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 6.779 −003 59.969 3.658 2.703 7.806
collude 2.323 −0.146 21.769 1.045 0.7 2.805
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
random 0.022 −1.974 26.779 −1.076 −1.434 0.166
randomAll 0.071 −2.161 2.137 0.175 −0.438 0.609
for each location a neighboring location at which the true measurements are the most
correlated to the true measurements at the considered location.6 The sensor located in
this neighboring location is considered as a peer. Empirical frequency R(x) is calculated
based on the reports of all sensors, except for the report of the sensor that is being
scored.
To demonstrate the correctness of our results, we examine four different reporting
strategies and evaluate their performance by analyzing the average scores of sensors.
The four strategies are defined as follows:
—honest: All sensors are honest.
—collude: Sensors collude so that those who observe low or medium report low, while
those who observe high or extrahigh report high.
—colludeLow: All sensors collude and report low.
—random: A sensor whose score is being calculated reports randomly with probabilities
Qw|w(low) = · · · = Qw|w(extrahigh) = 0.25; while other sensors are honest.
—randomAll: All sensors report randomly with probabilities Qp|p(low) = · · · =
Qp|p(extrahigh) = 0.25.
For each sensor, we run a separate process in which the sensors report according to
one of these strategy profiles, and we calculate the average payoff of the considered
sensor.
5.1.1. Stationary sensors. Wefirst consider a scenario in which each sensor is stationary,
that is, it occupies one location for the whole sensing period. The statistic of the average
PTSC payoffs is shown in Table I. These payoffs can be further scaled in different
ways, so that, for example, the incentives take positive values and cover the cost of
sensing.
As expected, random reporting strategies lead to scores that are concentrated around
0, which is clearly seen from themedian of random and randomAll strategies. Colluding
on a single value results in a payoff equal to 0, which trivially follows from the structure
of the score. The collusion strategy collude has a lowermean of the average payoffs than
honest reporting. Moreover, a careful inspection of medians and quartiles shows that
the collusive strategies are worse than honest reporting for the majority of sensors: the
median, the 1st quartile, the 3rd quartile, and the maximum of average payoffs are
greater for honest reporting than for the collusive strategies.
We tested the statistical significance of these results by applying the student’s t-test
on the average scores of sensors for each pair of the strategy profiles. The null hypoth-
esis was that the average payoff of a sensor rewarded with different schemes follows
the same distribution. As shown in Table II, the tests indicate that the distribution of
average payoffs for truthful reporting is significantly different than the distributions
of average payoffs for the other four strategy profiles, with p values less than 0.01.
6Note that we examine the correlations using the true data, not sensors’ reports that are not necessarily
truthful.
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Table II. T-tests: p-Values for Different Pair Strategies (Stat. Sensors)
Strategy honest collude colludeLow random randomAll
honest - 5 · 10−7 6 · 10−14 4 · 10−13 1 · 10−13
collude 5 · 10−7 - 3 · 10−12 1 · 10−7 2 · 10−11
colludeLow 6 · 10−14 3 · 10−12 - 0.94 0.301
random 4 · 10−13 1 · 10−7 0.94 - 0.873
randomAll 1 · 10−13 2 · 10−11 0.301 0.873 -
Fig. 2. Average payoffs of honest and random strategies for each sensor (stat. sensors), arranged in no
particular order along the x-axis.
Table III. Average Payoffs (Mobile Sensors)
Strategy Mean Min Max Median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 6.779 4.064 12.941 6.456 5.665 7.664
collude 2.323 1.052 5.141 2.027 1.755 2.707
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
random −0.008 −1.781 3.714 −0.294 −0.702 0.389
randomAll 0.03 −1.446 1.792 −0.109 −0.38 0.49
We obtain a similar result for the strategy collude. For the other three strategy pro-
files, one cannot reject the null hypothesis with the significance level α = 0.05. This
is not surprising considering that, for these three strategies, the average payoffs are
concentrated around 0.
The described scenario involves stationary sensors, so the sensors were solving ap-
proximately the same task over a longer period. This deviates from our assumption
that tasks are randomly distributed to workers, thus a sensor that reports randomly
might obtain a relatively high average payoff over a longer sensing period when the
histogram of its reports is more correlated to the reports of its peer than R is. Although
a sensor reports randomly, its reports carry some information about its peer with re-
gard to R; thus, it is not surprising that such a sensor might obtain positive rewards.
Note, however, that honest reporting leads to significantly higher payoffs, as shown in
Figure 2.
5.1.2. Mobile sensors. In community sensing, sensors are often mobile, in which case
the assumption about random task assignment is approximately fulfilled. Therefore,
we further investigate what happens when sensors’ locations are randomly selected
at each iteration. As shown by the statistic of the average PTSC payoffs in Table III
and p values in Table IV, the qualitative results are similar to the stationary case,
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Table IV. T-tests: p Values for Different Pairs of Strategies (Mobile Sensors)
Strategy honest collude colludeLow random randomAll
honest - 1 · 10−60 7 · 10−74 2 · 10−90 6 · 10−84
collude 1 · 10−60 - 5 · 10−57 3 · 10−48 6 · 10−61
colludeLow 7 · 10−74 5 · 10−57 - 0.933 0.637
random 2 · 10−90 3 · 10−48 0.933 - 0.739
randomAll 6 · 10−84 6 · 10−61 0.637 0.739 -
Fig. 3. Average payoffs of honest and random strategies for each sensor (mobile sensors), arranged in no
particular order along the x-axis.
with the main difference being the variance of the average payoffs.7 Furthermore, the
honest-reporting strategy results in significantly higher payoffs than random reporting
(Figure 3), as it is the case for stationary sensors.
5.2. PTSC in Peer Grading
In order to test the impact that PTSC has on the quality of grades, we designed a peer-
grading experiment within an “Artificial Intelligence” course at EPFL. In particular,
as a part of the evaluation process, the course contained three quizzes, each consisting
of two parts: in one part, students were asked to add a missing code; in the other, they
were asked to find mistakes in a given code. The three quizzes took place at different
time periods during the semester, assessing the knowledge about different topics of
the course. Each problem in the quizzes had a correct solution. These solutions were
used to assign points to the students, which were a part of the final grade. The official
corrections of the quizzes were done by the teaching assistants of the course. Before
the official points were announced, the students were asked to correct the solutions of
their colleagues based on the correct solutions.
A criterion to determine the quality of a solution for a part of a quiz in which students
were supposed to add a missing code was described by three to four different cases that
defined potential mistakes or shortcomings of a student’s solution. These cases were
designed so that each covers a combination of possibilities that can occur in students’
solutions, keeping in mind that the combinations are mutually exclusive between the
cases. Naturally, a peer grader was selecting only one of these cases, and reporting only
one value in total for the whole part. For the other part of the quiz, in which students
were supposed to find mistakes in a given code and correct them, a grading criterion
7The mean payoffs for honest and collude are identical for stationary (Table I) and mobile sensors (Table III)
simply because the means are calculated on the same set of values (the only difference is that, in the mobile
scenario, these values are permuted). For the random reporting strategies, these means are different because
we ran two different experiments over two different (randomly generated) sets of reports.
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was much easier to define. For each mistake in a given code, a student could either:
not find the mistake; find a mistake, but not correct it; or find a mistake and correct it.
Therefore, a peer grader was presented with these three possibilities. Note, however,
that a peer grader made such reports for all mistakes that were in a given code (four to
five), effectively reporting several values. Each reported value was separately treated
in a peer-rewarding mechanism.
To incentivize participation, we rewarded peer graders with bonus points (additional
points that could improve their grades), that were obtained using one of the three
different reward schemes: a constant reward, a peer consistency [Huang and Fu 2013b],
and PTSC. For the constant-reward regime, a peer grader who participated in the peer
grading obtained the maximum number of bonus points MaxTotalReward. For the
peer consistency, reward for reporting an answer was equal to MaxTotalRewardNumTasks if a chosen
peer reports the same answer, and was 0 otherwise. NumTasks denotes the number of
subparts to grade, which was equal to the number of reports that a peer grader made.
The PTSC mechanism was also applied for each report separately. Furthermore, the
scaling parameter of PTSC was equal to α = 12 · MaxTotalRewardNumTasks , and the scores were
shifted (increased) by α so that the bonus points turn out positive. If a total number
of the PTSC points exceeded MaxTotalReward, it was set to MaxTotalReward. Finally,
statistic R(x) in PTSCwas designed for each subpart of a quiz separately; it was defined
as an empirical frequency of grades equal to x among all reports that are rewarded
with PTSC for that subpart of the quiz.
To test the quality of the reward schemes, we split the students into three groups of
approximately the same number of students. Since participation in the peer grading ex-
periment was not obligatory, the sizes of these groups varied. Each group was rewarded
using all three reward schemes, but different mechanisms were applied for different
quizzes in a round robin fashion. That is: if PTSCwas used to assign rewards to a group
for peer grading the first quiz, the same group was rewarded with the constant reward
for peer grading the second quiz; if the peer consistency was used to assign rewards to
a group for peer grading the first quiz, the same group was rewarded by PTSC for peer
grading the second quiz, and so on.
In order to do a peer grading for a quiz, students needed to go through a tutorial
that explained the peer grading task and a reward scheme that was used to assign
bonus points; these were separately explained in two different sections. The tutorial
also contained two examples, one for the task explanation and one for the mechanism
explanation. Each example contained a simple test question for improving students’
understanding. Different schemes had a different example question, showing the most
basic features of the mechanisms. For the constant reward, students were asked to
answer how many points they would obtain upon fulfilling the peer grading task,
with three possible answers: MaxTotalReward per task, MaxTotalReward in total, or
it depends on how other raters grade. For the peer consistency, the question asked to
pick the correct claim, provided that the peer reported correct. The claims were for
reporting correct the reward is 0, for reporting incorrect the reward is MaxTotalRewardNumTasks ,
or for reporting correct the reward is MaxTotalRewardNumTasks . Finally, for PTSC, the question
asked what the reward was for reporting correct provided that everybody else reported
correct. The options were 5 · MaxTotalReward2·NumTasks , 3 · MaxTotalReward2·NumTasks , or 1 · MaxTotalReward2·NumTasks .8 The
options for each question were presented in a different order for different groups.
We measured the quality of raw data (nonaggregated responses from students) with
respect to the corrections made by the teaching assistants. For each student, we cal-
culated the number of correct reports. Then, for each mechanism, we determined the
8We used numerical values in all three of the test questions.
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Table V. Average Error Rate for Different Mechanisms
Mechanism Number of students Error rate (%)
PTSC 16 6.88
peer consistency 16 10.48
constant 14 11.98
Table VI. T-tests: p Values for Different Mechanisms
Mechanism PTSC Peer consistency Constant
PTSC - 0.0255 0.0497
peer consistency 0.0255 - 0.5566
constant 0.0497 0.5566 -
average error rate, that is, the percentage of incorrect grades. To measure the statis-
tical significance, we performed two-tailed student’s t-test, with the significance level
of 0.05. The null hypothesis was that students’ error rates for two groups rewarded by
different mechanisms follow the same distribution.
For the first two quizzes, each peer grader graded 4 partial solutions of one’s col-
leagues: 2 solutions to the first part of the quiz and 2 solutions to the second part of
the quiz. Since our analysis did not reveal any statistical significance of the accuracy of
the raw data across different schemes, we increased the number of solutions to grade
for the third peer-grading task. That is, for the third quiz, each peer grader graded
10 partial solutions of one’s colleagues: 5 solutions to the first part of the quiz and 5
solutions to the second part of the quiz.
The results of the third quiz are shown in Table V; for each group, they contain the
number of students and the average error rate. As we can see, PTSC outperforms the
baseline algorithms by 3% to 5%. Furthermore, t-tests (in Table VI) show that there is
a statistically significant difference between the error rates for the PTSC mechanism
and the error rates for the constant reward or the peer consistency, with p values equal
to 0.0497 and 0.0255, respectively.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Ensuring the accuracy of answers provided by workers is a major challenge for using
crowds as part of intelligent systems. Instead of paying fixed rewards, it is desirable to
use a payment scheme for which only workers that actually solve the tasks can expect
to receive a reward. Such a scheme is important for two reasons:
—to improve the accuracy of answers, thus complement filtering mechanisms such as
gold tasks and reputation systems, and
—to make worker self-selection help the mechanism by discouraging workers that do
not contribute useful results.
We show a new incentive scheme, called the Peer Truth Serum for Crowdsourcing
(PTSC), in which strategies that result in positive expected payments require workers
to solve the tasks and truthfully report the answers. PTSC is the first mechanism that
applies to problems with more than 2 answers and heterogeneous worker populations.
We show under which conditions the mechanism has strong incentive properties and
how to elicit the scaling parameters to achieve those properties. Due to its simplicity
and robustness, our payment scheme is applicable to a wide variety of crowdsourcing
settings, such as community sensing or peer grading in massive open online courses.
When the number of tasks is equal to 2, the robust version of PTSC (RPTSC) is
equivalent to the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism [Dasgupta and Ghosh 2013]. However,
when there is a significant number of tasks in a batch, the nonlinear structure of
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RPTSC allows correlations among different answer values, within the bounds of the
self-predicting condition. From a practical point of view, an interesting direction for
future work is to investigate an adaptive mechanism that would automatically deter-
mine the number of tasks needed to have sufficiently loose conditions for incentive
compatibility and optimality.
Another direction is to investigate the structure of the payments for large answer
spaces. Namely, the RPTSC has strong incentive properties in terms of a worker’s
expected payoff. For smaller answer spaces, the concentration inequalities, such as
Hoeffding’s inequality, imply that the overall payoff will very likely be close to the
expected value whenever a worker solves a reasonable number of tasks. For larger
answer spaces, one also needs to lower the variance of the RPTSC score; this can
potentially be achieved by investigating correlations among different possible answers,
similar to how Radanovic and Faltings [2014] designed a peer-rewarding mechanism
for elicitation of continuous signals.
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